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Abstract: 
I investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist 
statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman’s views. Based on 
the example of the stopping rule problem, I argue that PR can naturally be associated with 
frequentist statistics. Then I analyse Neyman’s conception of statistical inference to 
conclude that PR and Neyman’s conception are incongruent, although I indicate some 
common ground for both. Additionally, I show some inconsistencies in Neyman’s 
philosophy. I conclude that Neyman’s frequentism weakens the philosophical validity and 
universality of PR as analysed from the point of view of statistical methodology. 
 
1. Introduction 
Perspectival realism (“PR” hereafter) is a currently developing trend that can be recognised 
as one of the post-Kuhnian theories of science, within which a remarkable emphasis is put 
on the fact that cognitive and social dynamics are inseparable elements of the cognitive act 
and the dynamics of scientific knowledge development (see Collins, Evans 2002). In 
particular, proponents of PR “share the general idea that there is no ‘view from nowhere’ 
and that scientific knowledge cannot transcend a human perspective” (Ruyant 2020), 
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which means the truth condition of a hypothesis depends on an epistemic vantage point, 
but “it is in part mind-independent facts that make our theories true or false” (Ruyant 
2020). 
Statistical methodology can be regarded a non-physical scientific instrument 
invariably used to collect data and draw conclusions. Sampling as well as inferring are 
essentially based on statistical models. Those instruments and, subsequently, outcomes, are 
prone to a scientist’s perspective: there are several possible and acceptable statistical 
schemes of sampling and inferring, and researchers have to make decisions about the 
details therein. 
The way scientific statements are conceived and accepted with the use of specific 
statistical language and methods convey specific metaphysical commitments similarly to 
how the choice of the language, in general, conveys specific metaphysical assumptions, as 
famously argued by Russell (1905). Therefore, it seems scholarly justified to investigate 
the interplay between statistics and PR. Such an analysis shall offer a new perspective from 
which questions about universality, normativity, and the philosophical potential of PR can 
be posed. 
It has been argued that PR harmonises with many facts and methodological 
practices in the formulation and development of scientific theories (see, e.g., Massimi 
2018b). Although PR is sound when applied to cases of substantive content from exact 
sciences, its relation to statistical methodology appears to be undeveloped. There are 
perspectival accounts of investigation of aspects of the process of scientific investigation 
that concentrate on data (see, e.g., Jacoby 2020) observational instruments (see, e.g., Creţu 
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2020b) and nature of numerical representations (see, e.g.,Wolff 2019). Many authors, like 
Giere (2010), Rueger (2016), or Massimi (2018c) argue for perspectivism as regards to 
scientific (including mathematical) models of experiments and data, but without any 
specific consideration of properties of statistical schemes for sampling, inferring and 
interpretations thereof. An analysis of the Bayesian statistical approach in the spirit of PR 
has recently been led (Massimi 2021) but the relevant literature falls short in focusing 
specifically on frequentist statistical inferential methods interconnected with sampling 
schemes. 
Among the frequentist conceptions, one that could be similar to PR is Jerzy 
Neyman’s theory of statistical inference. Neyman was a 20th-century statistician who is 
recognised as one of the co-founders of the frequentist statistical paradigm, which 
dominated the methodology of natural and social sciences in the 20th century (Lehmann 
1985). His theory potentially has common grounds with PR because they share realistic 
and perspectivistic elements. The realistic element is present in Neyman’s theory because 
sought-out quantities are assumed to be unknown constants that relate to the independently 
existing world (Neyman 1937, 343-44) and the assertions are based on the conception of 
avoiding errors of false assertions (Neyman 1952, 55). The perspectivistic element is 
related to the emphasis on generalising theory-ladenness, in which “a model has to fit into 
the methodological framework that is conceived of as more fundamental, or prior, to 
modeling” (Lenhard 2006, 81). The second purportedly perspectival characteristic of 
Neyman’s methodological-philosophical conception is the dependence of the conclusive 
statements on the experimental scheme adopted (see, e.g., Neyman 1934). The perspectival 
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nature is perhaps a more general feature of frequentist statistics, best exemplified in the 
problem of the rule that governs how sampling is terminated: the conditionality of the 
shape of the statistical hypotheses (and of the outcome to be drawn from definite evidence) 
on a principle of stopping data collection (Savage 1962). 
The above reasons indicate the need to verify PR’s consistency with currently 
persisting scientific methodology and philosophy thereof as proposed by Neyman. The 
goal of this paper is to investigate whether PR can be consistent with the assumptions of 
frequentist statistics with an emphasis on the case study of Neyman’s conception. 
The structure of the article runs as follows. Firstly, in Section 2. I present the PR 
assumptions (2.1) and analyse their potential applicability to frequentist testing methods 
based on the example of the problem of the optional stopping rule (2.2). Next, in Section 2 
I reconstruct Neyman’s conception of statistical inference with an emphasis on his 
philosophical views and compare his stance with PR. In Section 3 I discuss aspects in 
which Neyman’s methodological and philosophical views are consistent with realism (3.1) 
and perspectivism (3.2) and then, in Section 4, I discuss antirealistic (4.1) pragmatistic 
(4.2) and antipluralistic (4.3) aspects of his theory. Finally, in Section 5 I offer some 
solutions for problems raised within the three aspects (5.1-5.3) and offer a generalised 
philosophical comment in 5.4. In Section 6 I summarise the results. 
 
2. PR as Applied to Frequentist Statistics 
2.1. Assumptions of PR 
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Perspectival realism is a stance that mediates between the extremes of the objective realist 
philosophy of science at one end and social constructivist at the other. Scientific claims are 
not non-relatively true but are not merely constructs of social interaction. They are 
products of interactions with mind-independent reality taken from several perspectives, 
thus they are true relative to a given perspective, and “not true simpliciter” (see Creţu 
2020a, 1-2). In addition to that, perspectival realism advocates epistemic pluralism: these 
perspectival truths are descriptions of mind-independent states of affairs from different 
points of view that can be incompatible, yet still equally valid epistemically because any 
knowledge of dispositional, objectively existing facts concerning objects or processes can 
only be acquired from a perspective (see Massimi 2012). Finally, that these perspective-
relative claims are true regarding the same objectively existing state of affairs implies that 
they retain, cross-perspectively, their performance adequacy as evaluated from the points 
of view of the internal standards set by each of the perspectives (see Massimi 2018a, 172). 
The notion of a perspective is quite vague in the literature and encompasses a type 
of perspective that could be labelled research traditions as well as narrow perspectives that 
are sophisticated theoretical frameworks or attitudes of a scientist or group of scientists 
(see Creţu 2020b). Perspectival aspects of statistical methodology discussed in this paper 
can be attributed to belonging to both, broad and narrow, categories. On one hand, this 
methodology encompasses principles or assumptions that form part of the working stance 
of a scientist, which is classified as narrow perspective (see Creţu 2020b, 29) but on the 
other hand these methodological attitudes are “second-order (methodological-epistemic) 
principles that can justify the scientific knowledge claims advanced” (Massimi 2019, 3) 
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which is classified as a wide perspective (see Creţu 2020b, 29). In this paper I scrutinise 
the perspectival nature of a sampling scheme and the inferential pattern both from a 
general level (e.g. frequentist vs. Bayesian methodological traditions, or approaches) and a 
detailed level (esp. establishing error risk level or details of observational pattern). 
2.2. The Optional Stopping Case-study  
Before I compare PR to Neyman’s views on statistical inference, it is essential to show that 
this conception of philosophy of science can be sensibly applied to explain some features 
of frequentist statistical methodology and so that PR and Neyman’s methodological-
philosophical conception have some common ground by sharing, at least partially, the 
same subject of reference. Otherwise, the value of comparing PR to Neyman’s philosophy 
would be little, just as there would be little value in the comparative analysis of, for 
example, mathematical predicativism and virtue epistemology as the two philosophical 
theories do not have a shared point of reference. 
An illustration of the application of the perspectival realist stance to the statistical 
methodology of testing hypotheses could be an analysis of the problem of optional 
stopping rules (see, e.g., Savage 1962; Lindley, Phillips 1976) involved in the research 
example of testing a hypothesis about the sex ratio of the pouch young of koala mothers in 
poor physical conditions (see McCarthy 2007, 31-33). 
Let us assume that the ecological hypothesis in question states that the proportion 
of males in the population of pouch young is     (the number of males and females is 
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equal), and the reasonable alternative hypothesis states that the proportion is less than     
(females prevail). 
The researcher surveyed    koala mothers, each with an offspring in its pouch—
three of the offspring were males and nine were females. The data could be obtained in at 
least two ways: the researcher could sample until the   th individual was recorded (  ), or 
until the  rd male was recorded (  ). Regardless of the sampling strategy, the data seem to 
be equivalent and the two alternative statistical inferences are as follows.  
Sampling in    is modelled by the binomial distribution that represents the 
probabilities of collecting   number of females until the number of trials in a sample 
reaches a fixed value of   ; the sum    of the probability of the observed data (number of 
females  ) and more extreme data (in this case of having   ,   , or    females in the 
sample) equals       thus the observed female ratio in the sample (    ), given a      
cut-off error rate, is not significantly far from (greater than) the hypothesised population 
ratio (   ). The conclusion of the test is not to reject the hypothesis. 
Sampling in    is represented by a different model—the negative binomial 
distribution that represents the probability of collecting   number of females until the 
number of males in a sample reaches a fixed value of  . The p-value    in this case is the 
sum of the probability of observation and less probable outcomes: having    female 
records,   ,   ,   ,   , and so on. The p-value equals       in this case, so with the 
conventional      error rate it is significantly low, thus the conclusion is to reject the 
hypothesis that the population ratio is    . 
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Therein lies the problem—two different sampling strategies, associated with 
different statistical models of an experiment, lead to different conclusions about the 
acceptance/rejection of, allegedly the same hypothesis, in the light of, allegedly, 
“equivalent” (McCarthy 2007, 37) set of data (evidence) in both cases, consisting of the 
observation of   females and   males in a sequence of    trials. 
 Below I put forth four arguments why the above methodological issue could be 
explained via reference to PR. 
I. Both possible observational points of view determine two different, equally valid ways 
in which statistical hypothesis is defined but both hypotheses are descriptions of a mind-
independent state of affairs, an objectively existing population characteristic—the 
proportion of pouch young males. This satisfies the PR assumption of realism. 
II. From the perspective of the methodology of natural sciences, a statement obtains 
scientific meaning once it is framed in such a way that it is possible to empirically verify it 
with the use of statistical tools. The statement about the characteristic in question becomes 
scientifically (empirically) meaningful only as framed in the empirical perspective of one 
or the other observational setup and the related statistical hypothesis (the probabilistic 
model of observation) that can be true or false. This is related to the fact that the parameter 
that represents the population ratio starts to have scientific meaning only within a 
particular probabilistic model of potential observations. The parameter as such is a 
constitutive element of a model and has no mathematical meaning on its own. This means 
the ratio in question, represented by the parameter, cannot be scientifically tested 
9 
 
differently than within a model. At the level of statistical consideration, the potential 
truthfulness is ascribed to statistical hypotheses—statements about the probability 
distribution of a random variable. Statistical hypotheses are relative to the observational 
perspective adopted. Therefore, their potential truthfulness is perspectival. 
III. The two perspectives differ in terms of knowledge claims. This is because they assume 
a different possible set of statistical hypotheses (different statements about probability 
distributions) that are alternative ways of representing an observable manifestation of the 
same physical reality. That is because the sampling spaces and models that serve to 
formulate the statistical hypothesis tested are different in both cases. The evidence is also 
not the same in these two hypothetical cases. The latter is due to both cases assuming a 
different set of relevant information (evidence) used for inferential purposes. In the case of 
  , a piece of partial information about the order, i.e., information about the location of the 
third male record in the sequence of trials, is encoded in the (negative binomial) model’s 
random variable. Evidence that was taken into account in    can be expressed through the 
proposition: “exactly three males and nine females were recorded in the sample until (and 
including) the twelfth trial was recorded in the sample”. In the sampling framework   , the 
evidence considered can be expressed in the proposition: “exactly three males had been 
recorded in the sample until (and including) the twelfth trial and the twelfth trial recorded 
in the sample was male”. It is easy to see that the second evidence implies the first, but not 
vice versa, therefore the evidence is not equivalent for both cases (Kubiak 2014, 138-139). 
IV. The method assumes the performance adequacy of perspectival statements about a 
state of the world if this state is true. In the considered example with particular data 
10 
 
obtained, the conclusions were different in both cases, but this is not inconsistent with PR. 
PR states that two perspectival statements shall retain performance adequacy if the 
common state of affairs they refer to is true. The method assumes that if the proportion of 
males in the population of pouch young is    , then the conclusion from    will retain high 
performance adequacy. That is because if an observation with the use of a sampling 
strategy from    were to be repeated iteratively, then the method would anticipate (correct) 
acceptance of the hypothesis that the population ratio is     with performance close to the 
standards set in this method (error risk close to   ). The same is true for sampling strategy 
  . Therefore, if the proportion of males in the population of pouch young is    , then both 
distributions that express the hypothesis tested are true—namely, the value     of the 
parameter   is true in both cases of application of different stopping rules and the statistical 
hypotheses tested in both cases will retain, cross-perspectively, their performance 
adequacy relative to standards set for both models. 
Points I-IV show that the same objectively existing state of affairs can be 
scientifically defined via different statistical models that encompass different, 
incommensurable, observational perspectives and knowledge claims. Although 
conclusions from testing are to be different for specific evidence possible to be obtained, 
like the one from the case just considered, the two different tested hypotheses will have the 
same performance adequacy if the objective state of affairs represented by them is true. 
The upshot is that PR can have its exemplification in frequentist statistical methodology 
and so can be a potentially plausible explanation of some of its troublesome features, like 
the problem of optional stopping. The corollary is that Neyman’s frequentist conception 
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can be sensibly juxtaposed with PR. In the subsequent two sections of this paper, we 
investigate Neyman’s frequentist methodology taken jointly with his philosophical 
interpretation thereof as compared to PR. I start by explicating in Section 3 two elements 
of Neyman’s view that are consistent with PR. Next, in Section 4 I discuss elements 
inconsistent with PR. Some elements of Neyman’s thought presented in those two sections 
have not yet been presented to the debate in the philosophy of statistics. 
 
3. Neyman’s Theory—Elements Coherent with PR 
Jerzy Neyman was not a professional philosopher; therefore, in communicating his 
philosophical views he did not use the terminology commonly used in the relevant 
philosophical debates. Nonetheless, part of his philosophical stance has been explicated 
and disputed in the philosophical literature (e.g., Hacking, 1965; Mayo Spanos 2006), In 
this section, we structure those parts of his conception that could be viewed as realism-like 
and perspectivism-like. 
3.1. Neyman’s Views and Realism 
Some of Neyman’s basic methodological and meta-methodological conceptions appear to 
match realist ideas. Firstly, Neyman did not reject the assumption of the existence of an 
independent reality (an ontological aspect of realism). Virtually every time he talked about 
the conceptually unknown true value of the hypothesis parameters. The values of the 
hypothesis parameter(s) that a researcher asks about, were to Neyman “generally unknown 
constants” (Neyman 1937, 343). The constant value of the statistical model’s parameter(s) 
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is as such a mathematical concept, but Neyman writes that “there are real objects that 
correspond to these abstract concepts in a certain sense” (Neyman 1952, 24). Therefore, 
the truthfulness of the value of the hypothesis parameter would mean that this value 
somehow corresponds to, or denotes an unknown, but independently existing state of 
affairs in the real world. By that, Neyman seems to be assuming at least ontological 
realism. What is the nature of the said correspondence?   
The general idea of applying statistical schemes to experiments/observations is to 
“assume that the real value of the sought-after quantity exists […] and—based on laws of 
large numbers—to seek for calculable measurement results’ functions that can be 
considered approximations of the ‘true value’ and mean error” (1923a
1
, 19, auth. transl.). 
Therefore, it appears that to Neyman the ideal is to come up with conclusions, in the form 
of the values of these functions, where “numerical values of mathematical formulas more 
or less agree with the results of the actual measurements” (Neyman 1952, 24). The values 
of these functions of actual measurements are expected to be approximately the same as 
the “real values” that exist independently in the real world, which assumes an epistemic 
realist approach.  What will be important in my further analysis is that Neyman speaks in 
the plural when he refers to “functions”, which indicates possibly different functions to be 
used to yield the outcome based on the empirical evidence obtained. Still, all these 
possibly different outcomes are thought to both agree with the evidence to a certain extent 
and to approximate the objective truth.  
The conception of the reliability of the method of statistical inference is anchored in 
the conceptions of the probability of two types of error: the probability of rejection of the 
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tested hypothesis if it is true and the probability of acceptance of an alternative if it is true 
(Neyman 1952, 55). A true hypothesis is one in which the stated parameter range covers 
this unknown, true, real value. The method’s reliability is based on performance in 
yielding true conclusions in the long run. Therefore, a kind of epistemic realism seems to 
be something that drives the method’s reliability in the long term.  
Finally, Neyman required the research schemes to be adjusted to the real-world 
factors that exist objectively and independently of the research scheme. Ignoring these 
factors might affect the correspondence between a physical (substantial) and a statistical 
hypothesis. Neyman’s illustration of this issue refers to the famous Fisher’s toy example of 
a hypothesis that a lady cannot tell whether the tea or milk was poured in the cup first 
based on the taste of the tea. An independent factor would be, for instance, an association 
of the lady’s impression of a definite sequence of pouring with the thickness of the cup, 
which the lady can feel with her lips. If the experiment scheme does not take this into 
account and it happens that one of the two pouring methods is predominantly used with 
thinner cups and the other with thicker ones, then the substantial hypothesis of lack of 
ability may be true, while the corresponding statistical hypothesis—the distribution of 
probabilities of possible experiment’s outcomes under the assumption of lack of ability—
will be false (Neyman 1950, 282-291). 
It can be concluded that some of the very foundational methodological and meta-
methodological conceptions of Neyman appear to match realist ideas. Hypotheses speak of 
an independently existing reality and they are either true or false about this reality. 
Moreover, the whole research scheme is expected to be adequate in respect to 
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independently existing, real factors. This confirms the presence of some ideas of 
ontological and epistemic perspectivism in Neyman’s thought. 
3.2. Neyman’s Views and Perspectivism 
Although true statistical hypothesis represents the real value of a quantity existing 
independently in the world, it does so by rendering the empirical meaning to this real 
value. A statistical hypothesis is a statement about the probability (density) distribution of 
a random variable where a random variable is a function of a set of random phenomena 
obtained in the effect of performing a random experiment.  This means the distribution, 
and so the hypothesis is partially a product of specificity of the observational 
(experimental) set-up. Specifically, the notion of probability as used in the statistical 
hypothesis is that it does not refer to physical objects, or the properties of physical objects, 
but to the properties of physical events that correspond to an observational setup; in other 
words, the probability is ascribed not to objects, but events related to an observational 
setup (Neyman 1952, 10-12). This is visible, for example, in Neyman’s comment on 
Jeffrey’s toy example of two boxes. One contains one white and one black ball, while the 
other has one white and two black ones. Firstly, a box is to be randomly selected and then 
a ball at random from that box. Consider Neyman’s definition of probability “the 
probability,  ( | ), of an object   having the property   will be defined as the ratio 
 ( | )   ( )  ( )⁄ ” (Neyman 1937, 337) When applied to this toy example, it is not 
the probability of the ball selected having the property of being white: 
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“the objects   are obviously not balls, but pairs of random selections, the first of a 
box, and the second of a ball [thus], the probability sought is that of a pair of 
selections ending with a white ball” (Neyman 1952, 11) 
Thus, in the eyes of Neyman, probabilities directly refer to properties of 
observational designs or procedures. Statistical hypotheses are statements about probability 
(density) distribution and by that, they are relativised to those designs in the same way. 
Even if they are to represent substantial hypotheses about the mechanisms or other 
characteristics of an objectively existing reality, they do so only through the perspectives 
of experimental constructs that determine what can be experienced. This view of 
Neyman’s is in line with the consequences of the stopping rule problem discussed in 
Section 2. 
So it appears that Neyman found scientific statements formulated with the use of 
statistical tools to be always relative to the perspectives of idealised assumptions and 
experimental constructs but at the same time to refer to the perspective-independent, true 
states of affairs: real parameter values and real experimental setups and circumstances. He 
thought a fraction of these statements to be true (in the classical sense) to the extent 
defined by the error rates.  
Additionally, he appeared to accept the possibility of equally valid perspectives on 
the foundational assumptions of scientific methodology:  
“[…] in theoretical work, the choice between several equally legitimate theories is 
a matter of personal taste. In problems of application, the personal taste is again 
16 
 
the decisive moment, but it is certainly influenced by considerations of relative 
convenience and empirical facts” (Neyman 1937, 336 footnote *). 
The theories here refer to methodological frameworks. If they can be “equally valid”, then 
one can speak of the epistemic pluralism of perspectives, which was told to be an element 
of PR. 
The presented elements of Neyman’s conceptions that can be regarded as realism-
like and perspectivism-like make his views fairly consistent with perspectival realism thus 
far. Nevertheless, other important elements of Neyman’s approach seem to be inconsistent 
with PR and also make Neyman’s views internally inconsistent. These are the theses about 
the fictional character of scientific concepts, the pragmatistic (non-epistemic) 
interpretation of a scientific assertion, and the idea of normative anti-pluralism. I discuss 
these three topics in the follow-up section.  
 
4. Neyman’s Theory—Elements Potentially Inconsistent with PR 
4.1. Fictional Nature of Scientific Concepts 
Due to Neyman statistical hypotheses are stated under idealised assumptions which are 
false regarding the real world and empirical evidence: 
“The objects in the real world, or rather our sensations connected with them, are 
always more or less vague and since the time of Kant, it has been realized that no 
general statement concerning them is possible. The human mind grew tired of this 
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vagueness and constructed a science from which everything that is vague is 
excluded—this is mathematics. […] there are many mathematical theories that are 
successfully applied to practical problems. However, this does not mean that these 
theories deal with real objects [...] the theory [of mathematical statistics] itself 
deals with abstract concepts not existing in the real world” (Neyman, 1952, 23-
24).  
This might suggest that Neyman believed that there is no truth-correspondence 
between scientific models and the real world. This seems to explicitly contradict the 
elements of Neyman’s views presented in 3.1. At this point, Neyman appears to be 
ambiguous on whether he identifies the “real” world with the world of physical 
“objects” (or systems) or the world of “sensations connected with them”—empirical 
observations. Nonetheless, the problem of weak correspondence between hypotheses 
(probability distributions defined with the use of abstract concepts) and the evidence 
seems to be the major issue for him as “no observations are capable of producing the 
value of a given probability” (Neyman 1957a, 15). Below I develop this point by 
referring to Neyman’s writings. 
The connection of scientific evidence from particular research with a statistical 
hypothesis is problematic because of the limiting theorems of statistics and the regularity-
type character of the hypothesised statements. In Neyman’s view, probabilities must be 
understood as describing these regularities, so the existence of a (sufficient) 
correspondence between evidence and hypothesis would require sufficiently long 
sequences of replications of the research on a particular matter, which is nowadays 
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regarded as usually an unfulfilled condition (perhaps except for quality-control cases of 
research) and an ideal difficult to be achieved (see Rubin 2020). Therefore, the 
correspondence between an observation from single research and a statistical hypothesis 
must be regarded as very weak. 
The problem of the correspondence between evidence and scientific statements is 
not restricted only to statistical hypotheses understood as idealised empirical models of 
natural mechanisms, or of population characteristics. The same problem prevails at the 
level of a single trial and empirical evidence obtained from it. This can be explained by 




, where the author introduced a general 
design for a field experiment conducted for the sake of comparison of different varieties of 
crops concerning their potential yields. 
He considered there the design of the experiment based on the random assignment 
of seeding to plots in an experimental field. Each seeding ends up with what he called true 
yield. However, the outcome of the measurement of a yield of certain yeast varieties 
measured (with high accuracy) at a particular plot is not the true yield of that variety at that 
plot, which is itself an unknown, fixed value (Neyman 1923a
2
, 465-67).  This divergence is 
due to the technical error of the measurement. The true yield itself is an idealised 
conception, namely, the mean value from indefinite repetitions of the measurement with all 
                                                 
1
 Originally published in Polish (English translation of the original title is: An Attempt to Justify 
The Application of Probability Theory to Field Experiments; transl.—Author). The paper’s core 
section was edited and translated into English in 1990 by D.M. Dąbrowska and T.P. Speed. In this 
thesis, reference to the Polish original will take the form of “1923a
1
” while the form “1923a
2
” will 
refer to the fragment translated in 1990. 
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conditions being equal except for the differences in random technical error that causes 
inaccuracy of an experimental technique. This kind of error is different than the error in 
statistical inference about the hypotheses and “no statistical methods can improve the 
accuracy of the experiment beyond the limits fixed by the technical random error” 
(Neyman et al. 1935, 110). Therefore, there is no equivalence between the true yield from 
a particular trial and an observed yield regarding this trial. 
The differences between the two conceptions become striking when one realises 
that the true yield at a particular trial (plot) is essentially a priori counterfactual state of 
affairs because of the infinite number of counterfactual unrealised measurements involved 
in the conception of the true yield (see Rubin 1990). To stress the lack of equivalence 
between a scientific concept and observable facts, Neyman distinguished two different 
meanings of terms (such as yield) when used in two different aspects of the scientific 
process: in describing empirical data (Neyman called it “pure empiricism”), and in making 
inferences to a scientific scheme (Neyman 1923a
1
, 18). In the first case, one is speaking of 
the result(s) of empirical observations (measurements)
2
 and in the second—of scientific 
concepts that put these observations into more general frames. The specificity of using a 
term in a sense of it being a scientific concept is that “all scientific terms, which are 
defining properties and relations between investigated objects, are fictions” (Neyman 
1923a
1
, 18). The true yield in Neyman’s conception is an example of such a scientific, and 
therefore fictional expression.Leaving linguistic oddity aside, this upshot is ambiguous to 
                                                 
2
 In contemporary apparatus this kind of activity would be labeled descriptive statistics, as opposed 
to inferential statistics. 
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the extent that Neyman seems to determine this fictional character of the concept as related 
to the outcome of observation, not to the unknown, real-world property or propensity of an 
object or experimental setting. By that, he appears to conflate the notion of the real world 
with the notion of results of empirical observations. Anyhow, the idea that scientific 
concepts are fictional somewhat contradicts his realistic views as presented in 3.1.  
4.2. The Pragmatistic (Non-epistemic) Interpretation of a Scientific Assertion 
 The second element of Neyman’s theory possibly inconsistent with PR is the 
stance that acceptance of a scientific statement does not yield any belief about the 
truthfulness of a particular scientific statement: 
“The terms ‘accepting’ and ‘rejecting’ are very convenient and are well-
established. It is important, however, to keep their exact meaning in mind, and to 
discard various additional implications which may be suggested by intuition. 
Thus, to accept [or reject respectively] a hypothesis   means only to decide to 
take action   rather than action  . This does not mean that we necessarily believe 
that the hypothesis is true [or false respectively]” (Neyman 1950, 259). 
Neyman and Pearson even stressed that acceptance/rejection of a particular hypothesis 
could not—for methodological reasons—be understood epistemically: 
“[…] as far as a particular hypothesis is concerned, no test based upon the theory 
of probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood 
of the […] hypothesis” (Neyman, Pearson 1933, 291). 
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This impossibility came to agree with Neyman’s moral-like postulate: “The beliefs of 
particular scientists are a very personal matter and it is useless to attempt to norm them by 
any dogmatic formula” (Neyman 1957b, 16).  
The stated impossibility and undesirability of the epistemic interpretation of 
outcomes of the application of the frequentist procedures is reflected in Neyman’s 
pragmatist interpretation of the goal of the method of scientific investigation with the 
use of statistical tools. Although “[…] theory was born and constructed with the view 
of diminishing the relative frequency of errors, particularly of ‘important’ errors” 
(Neyman 1977, 108), an acceptance of a hypothesis is an act of will to behave as if the 
hypothesis was true, based on the assumption that the method, that we are using to do 
this, is reliable enough not to lead us astray from the truth in a sufficiently large 
fraction of practically important cases. That is why the final stage of accepting a 
hypothesis 
“[…] amounts to taking a ‘calculated risk’, to an act of will to behave in the future 
(perhaps until new experiments are performed) in a particular manner, conforming 
with the outcome of the experiment. It is this act of adjusting our behavior to the 
results of observations, that is the overlooked element of the final stages in 
scientific research and that is covered by the term ‘inductive behavior’” (Neyman 
1957b, 12). 
This act of will is already present at the stage of choosing a test (decision rule) that has 
the desired properties (performance characteristic) based on pragmatic considerations:  
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“The adoption of hypothesis   when it is false is an error qualitatively different 
from the error consisting of rejecting   when it is true. This distinction is 
essential because, with rare exceptions, the importance of the two errors is 
different, and this difference must be taken into consideration when selecting the 
appropriate test” (Neyman, 1950, 261). 
Realism seems to presuppose that scientific conclusions are accepted based on the 
ideal of them being at least approximately, or probably true. It appears that it would be 
hard to assimilate epistemic realism with the fact that particular scientific conclusions 
(outcomes of performing a statistical test) are effects of the need to fulfil pragmatic goals, 
that they cannot be evaluated in terms of their truthfulness and cannot pose a basis for 
beliefs. 
4.3. Anti-pluralistic Elements in Neyman’s Conception  
In Section 2, I have shown that frequentist statistical methodology is consistent with 
perspectivism. In subsection 3.2. I indicated that Neyman’s understanding of scientific 
claims was also that they have a perspectival nature. Additionally, I indicated his advocacy 
of a certain degree of pluralism of methodological perspectives. In what follows I show 
that his views on this matter are at least ambivalent and are not fully consistent. I argue 
that from the viewpoint of Neyman’s conceptions pluralism should be understood as a 




Neyman’s thought has two anti-pluralistic aspects. Both relate to taking somewhat 
God’s eye’s view. One is the perspective that could be called the in-theory perspective, and 
the other is the perspective of justifying the theory from a meta-level point of view. I first 
discuss the in-theory perspective.  It can be further divided into bottom-up and top-down 
kinds of anti-pluralism. The first is related to the epistemic adequacy of models/setups, 
while the second refers to the epistemic efficacy of statistical inference. 
The bottom-up kind is the one that aims at searching for (selecting) the model of an 
experiment that is optimally adjusted to physical reality (see Neyman 1950, 282-291). 
Neyman pinpointed some crucial aspects by referring to the example of the tea tasting lady 
(see 3.1). To perform the experiment, one has to determine an adequate set of admissible 
hypotheses. For example, should the alternative hypothesis to the one that the lady does 
not have the ability (she makes random guesses) point in the direction of a perfect guess or 
perfect misguidance? The lady may be able to discriminate between pouring methods, but 
simply conflates one method with the other. Another issue is whether one is asking about 
the lady being able to discriminate between the two methods or identify each. In the 
second case, the cups should not be judged by comparison between the two in the pair, but 
independently. However, what if she can identify one of the methods, but is uncertain 
about the other? Does she know how many cups made with one of the methods she will be 
given? If so, then the trials should be treated as dependent. Finally, it is essential to arrange 
a proper technique for a random experiment, in which any factor that may affect the 
correspondence between a physical and a statistical hypothesis is neutralised by its 
randomisation, an example of which—referring to the order of pouring—I already 
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provided in 3.1. In conclusion, taking into account manifold factors prompts one to seek 
the best experimental set-up rather than to treat different possible setups as equally valid. 
Another example of the bottom-up anti-pluralist approach of Neyman is his theory 
of utilising sampling design for the sake of optimal estimation (1934; 1938) Speaking of 
estimation in this context is equally valid as speaking of hypothesis tests, as there is a 
duality between hypothesis tests and Neyman’s technique of estimation by intervals: an 
estimation technique is tantamount to performing a series of hypothesis tests (see Neyman 
1937, 372; Lehmann, Romano 2005,164-168). Neyman develops techniques of how to 
maximise the accuracy of estimation by taking into account some additional facts about the 
structure of the population studied in terms of some auxiliary factors. The technique 
assumes consideration of several, mathematically equally valid, ways of how a sample 
could be drawn from the population, to choose the one that is, from the perspective of this 
knowledge, the most accurate sampling design. 
All of the above indicates that Neyman advocated achieving the optimal adequacy 
between the theoretical models of observation and all known aspects of the investigated 
reality by fulfilling several specific conditions like those above, thus by narrowing down 
the possible observational perspectives from which a test of a hypothesis could be 
performed to the one that best corresponds to reality. 
The top-down type of Neyman’s anti-pluralistic view on the choice of research 
perspective is perhaps best exemplified by the normative requirement to use a test whereby 
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the probability of correctly rejecting a hypothesis would be maximal for a preassigned 
error of the first type: 
“if two different critical regions   and    are suggested, both insuring the same 
probability of error of the first kind, then the choice between these regions 
depends on their effectiveness in controlling the error of the second kind” 
(Neyman 1950, 304). 
Originally, the rule was presented as applied to choosing among several equally 
acceptable test statistics, but as such, the idea of minimising the error of the second kind 
when choosing between equally acceptable, equivalent mathematical models, can be 
applied when the choice is to be made between equivalent ways of collecting the data. 
From this point of view, the two alternative perspectives adopted in the discussed example 
of testing the hypothesis of the number of males and females of pouch young being even 
will not be equally valid. If the consideration of a test’s power function “seems to be the 
proper rational basis for choosing the test” (Neyman, 1952, 58), then the perspective of 
sampling design related to    is methodologically preferable as it guarantees that the test’s 
power is higher than the perspective of the sampling design related to   . For example, if 
the true value of the ratio in question was     , then the power to detect it in the case of 
adopting the stopping rule and the model related to    would equal      and in the case of 
   it would equal      . 
Neyman’s meta-methodological views also appear to contrast with the plurality of 
perspectives by suggesting that, in principle, some methodologies will be more optimal for 
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particular cases than others. For example, Neyman admitted that the Bayesian 
methodological framework for testing or estimation can be mathematically perfectly valid, 
and yet he believed that regarding the usage of the method, the Bayesian approach “may be 
applied in practice only in quite exceptional cases” (1937, 343). 
 
5. Philosophical Consequences 
I have argued that PR can have its exemplification in frequentist statistical 
methodology and be a potentially fruitful explanation of some of its troublesome 
features. Nevertheless, when applied to Neyman’s frequentism, PR turns out to be 
only partially consistent with it. 
Neyman speaks about the existence of real numerical values and real objects but is 
equivocal on how scientific concepts refer to the real world. The method’s reliability is 
entrenched in its performance in yielding true outcomes, but, diversely, the acceptance of 
hypotheses is dependent partially on pragmatic considerations, and what is more, the 
truthfulness of particular scientific assertions cannot be assessed. Neyman appears to stress 
the perspectival nature of scientific investigations and statistical concepts, but, diversely, 
his methodological advice implies that different perspectives do not have equal validity 
and perspectivism should be avoided at different stages and levels of this investigation. 
The incoherences of Neyman’s methodological philosophical views, which 
emerged as a result of the analyses in Sections 3 and 4, prompt the need for an attempt to 
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reinterpret his methodology from the perspective of its possible congruency with PR. In 
this section, I scrutinise the incoherence with this attempt. 
5.1. Overcoming the Unclear Status of Scientific Concepts 
I indicate in 5.1. that in discussing the relations between the real world and hypothesis, 
Neyman was most clear and unequivocal in explaining the relation between hypothesis and 
evidence. Although the consequence of a weak connection between evidence and statistical 
models is that the relation between evidence and independent reality is also weak, this does 
not mean models (and thus statistical hypotheses) are fictitious when it comes to their 
relation to independent reality (“real world”). This is because the real world does not 
reduce to the world of empirical data. Neyman seems to mistakenly equal the two notions 
(the real world with empirical data) when speaking of the fictional character of scientific 
concepts. This is because he indicated that their fictional nature becomes evident when 
they are contrasted with “empiricism”. Interestingly, equating the “real world” with 
empirical data has prevailed in statistical thought until recently (see Kass 2011, 2).  
If a model of empirical outcome does not conform to a single empirical outcome, this 
does not mean the model is false or fictitious in terms of it representing the independent 
reality of more generalised mechanisms and propensities that are the (probabilistic) cause 
of obtaining an outcome of a certain type. Indeed, Neyman was talking about real, 
unknown characteristic of a studied population with regard to which a hypothesis as a 
statement about this characteristic can be true (or false). Empirical data obtained in 
observation are known, so they must be regarded as something different than those 
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unknown characteristics with regard to which a scientific statement can be true. Therefore, 
Neyman’s statement about the fictionality of all scientific terms should be understood as 
pertaining to a weak evidence—model correspondence, where evidence is something 
different than the real world. Such a view does not contradict the realistic interpretation of 
statistical terms and hypotheses with regard to real world understood as something 
different from the world of empirical data. The unknown value of true yield, which can 
only be estimated, or assumed to be equal to the observed value for practical simplicity, 
can be representing the propensity of physical (system of) objects to behave in certain, 
observable ways under repeated observations in certain conditions. Although it is 
impossible to have an exact empirical realisation of this hypothesised behaviour, the 
accepted scientific statement can still be regarded as approximately true as regards the 
unobserved features of the real world. 
In 4.1 I indicated Neyman’s view that the real world is “vague” while the mathematical 
models that describe these ontic states are idealisations that deviate from these ontic states 
and that are “fictitious”, which means false. Take, for example, the hypothetical example 
of a wheel of fortune that was meant by the designer to be fair (which is known to be rather 
uncommon). The ontic mechanism/character of its propensity must differ from the 
mathematical model that describes it, as there will never be such a perfect symmetry in it 
as described by the designer’s model. However, idealisation does not exclude the 
approximate truthfulness of such models; therefore, realism remains in force. 
5.2. Overcoming The lack of Epistemic Interpretation of a Single Outcome 
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Neyman seems to be ambiguous as far as realism is concerned, in his insistence that a 
statistical method is a tool for making pragmatic decisions rather than acquiring true 
beliefs. This is because he seems to simultaneously assume that the method’s reliability in 
yielding those pragmatically useful conclusions in the long run is based on the method’s 
reliability in yielding conclusions that are sufficiently often true in a realistic sense, as I 
argued in 3.1. 
Epistemic realism seems to be in force regarding a body of assertions as an effect of 
the uses of N-P. This is due to error probabilities based on which the procedure may be 
deemed reliable when it is iteratively used in manifold research contexts with different 
hypotheses and error rates set at different levels. According to Neyman, the Central Limit 
Theorem allows us to conclude that the relative frequency of error will be close to the 
arithmetic mean of the error regardless of context (Neyman 1977, 108-109). This means 
the average error is an indicator of how a big part of the assertions from a body of 
outcomes of statistical tests is true, although the question of the truthfulness of any 
particular one must be abandoned. 
It appears then that a special case of realism may apply to Neyman’s methodology. 
This specificity of a realistic interpretation of scientific outcomes would here mean the 
applicability of realism to them being understood as a collective of outcomes that jointly 
forms a body of scientific knowledge. One could also imagine the perspective of the same 
true hypothesis being iteratively tested through replications of an experiment that are never 




5.3. Bogged Down in Neyman’s Anti-pluralistic Inclinations. 
In the previously cited (in 3.2.) footnote from the 1937 paper Neyman indicates that when 
choosing statistical theories (methodological framework) in the context of problems of 
application, “personal taste” remains “decisive”, but in the fragment from the same paper 
cited at the very end of 4.3. he suggests that the choice is determined by the objective 
context of the research; this could be for example prior knowledge of the population 
studied, or of conditions of the experiment. In one of the later works, he is even more 
emphatic by claiming that there should be no “dogmatism” regarding application aspects: 
“What I am opposed to is the dogmatism which is occasionally apparent in the 
application of Bayes’ formula when the probabilities a priori are not implied by 
the problem treated, and the author attempts to impose on the consumer of 
statistical methods the particular a priori probabilities invented by himself for this 
particular purpose” (Neyman 1957b, 19). 
Neyman allows methodological choices to be based on “personal taste”. 
Methodological choices can determine the outcome of the application of statistical 
procedures.
3
 However, “inventing” the prior also determines the outcome, and can 
also be understood as a methodological choice based on “personal taste”. Why 
influential personal taste is acceptable when Neyman speaks of the statistical 
                                                 
3
 I exposed this in Section 2. 
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methodology adopted by him and is not acceptable when Neyman speaks of the 
Bayesian statistical methodology remains unexplained and seems inconsistent. 
This is a striking example of the incompatibility of Neyman’s statements 
concerning statistical constructs as applied to reality: there is a tension between the idea of 
the decisiveness of “personal taste” in choosing the mathematical construct, which entails 
the acceptance of the pluralism of perspectives, and the tendency to eradicate the 
equivalence of perspectives both at the meta-methodological and methodological level.  
This inconsistency can be explained by narrowing down this decisive element to 
only one aspect—the pragmatic choice of standards for the two types of error, which is 
indeed inherently pluralistic since “this subjective element lies outside of the theory of 
statistics” (Neyman 1950, 263). Therefore, Neyman’s method can be regarded as 
advocating pluralism in respect of the pragmatic-value driven differentiation of error risks 
and only in this aspect. However, this does not solve the problem of Neyman’s 
inconsistency. Both setting error risks in frequentism and setting the prior probability of a 
hypothesis in Bayesianism are factors that influence the outcomes of the application of the 
respective procedure. The choice of which type of error is more important (and to what 
extent) than the other can be—according to Neyman—burdened with subjective, personal 
taste, but the choice of the prior cannot. It appears that the problem boils down to the 
question of what can be assumed to be “outside of the theory of statistics”, and what may 
be thought to belong to it. Neyman seemed to push pluralism aside to this outer world and 
decide that setting the nominal value of the error rate is of this outside-world type while 
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setting the value of the prior probability would be of the inside-world type. Yet, he did so 
in a somewhat arbitrary way. 
Anyhow, this pluralism-like declaration of Neyman happens to be an empty one. 
As illustrated in 4.3, Neyman promotes the avoidance of pluralism of perspectives in 
several respects except for one specific aspect—the setting of error risks. Neyman 
assumes, despite his anti-pluralistic inclinations, that a full eradication of pluralism of 
perspectives is not achievable, and not only because of the assumed pluralistic nature of 
pragmatic perspectives represented by different settings of error rates. The other difficulty 
is related to the top-down kind of methodological anti-pluralism. As I indicated in 4.3, it 
comprises of preference for the mathematical function of the data that decreases the II
nd
 
type error. However, as Neyman and Pearson (see, e.g., 1933, 298) specify, it is not always 
possible to find among several possible functions the one that will minimise the risk of II
nd
 
type error for each possibility of realisation for an alternative hypothesis.  
All things considered, Neyman’s view ought to be regarded as incongruent with 
perspectivism because of Neyman’s conditional acceptance of the pluralism of 
perspectives only for the cases in which he seems not to see any solution within the theory 
of statistics that would help to eradicate it. 
5.4. Perspectival Realism? Yes, but No. 
The case of the stopping rule issue considered in Section 3 suggests that from a general 
point of view, PR might be regarded as fairly consistent with frequentist statistical 
methodology. This is because different acceptable perspective-relative statistical 
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hypotheses can refer to the same objectively existing state of affair. If they are true 
regarding the same objectively existing state of affair, they will retain, cross-perspectively, 
their performance adequacy, i.e. long-run acceptance rate, as evaluated from the points of 
view of the internal standards—the error risks—set by each of the perspectives. If a 
hypothesis tested is false and an alternative hypothesis is true, the difference in power to 
detect this truth, and so the difference in performance adequacy of the alternative can be 
rationalised by PR in the same way. 
Nonetheless, when one considers the version of this methodology as presented by 
Neyman things gets complicated. Realism remains a plausible stance. The assumption of 
the existence of real-world natural mechanisms, or a population of objects with their 
natural attributes is consistent with Neyman’s stance. When a body of assertions is taken 
into account it can be assumed that an expected number of them can be regarded as 
approximately true in regard to those mechanisms or population characteristics. 
Perspectivism is much less in line with Neyman’s views. Hypotheses are statistically 
defined relative to the perspectives of observational design and mathematical framework 
adopted, but Neyman is in principle against pluralism on a meta-methodological and 
methodological level. He advocates certain methodological norms for discriminating those 
possible methodologies and research designs that would be epistemically best. This means 
seeking frameworks and designs that would be most empirically adequate and that would 
minimise error risk (or maximise accuracy), even though this is not always possible, as he 
admits. This attitude seems to be in line with Neyman’s aversion to the Bayesian attitude. 
A pluralistic approach to the construction of perspectival statistical hypotheses, which are 
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statements about probability (density) distribution, would be somewhat analogical to 
acceptance of subjective probabilities in the Bayesian framework. 
Interestingly, the alleged methodological philosophical stopping rule riddle that can 
be explained by applying the philosophical principles of PR could be alternatively resolved 
by the principle of optimisation of power that is of methodological, not philosophical, 
nature. This suggests that the philosophical conceptions that encapsulate, rationalise, and 
harmonise some of the known cognitive problems of the sciences may become superfluous 
once proper methodological solutions are devised.  
Perhaps PR could be modified to better correspond with Neyman’s views. Firstly, 
instead of it being perceived as the globally unavoidable and best philosophical description 
of the nature of scientific process and its outcomes, PR’s explanatory value could be 
relativised to some situations or aspects. Secondly, PR could be understood not as a 
normative guideline for scientists and methodologists, but as a temporarily plausible 
explanation of some states of affairs in science and scientific methodology that may in 
some respects become invalidated in time with the growth of knowledge or development of 
scientific methodology. Nonetheless, Neyman’s frequentism is not the only approach to 
statistics and philosophy thereof, therefore no outcome of juxtaposition of PR with his 





By using the example of the stopping rule problem, I argued that PR naturally 
conforms to frequentist statistical methodology. Nonetheless, PR and frequentism are 
incongruent as far as Neyman’s methodological-philosophical frequentist conception is 
concerned. 
What makes Neyman’s stance close to perspectival realism is that scientific 
statements are expressed through observational and conceptual perspectives and at the 
same time they refer to the perspective-independent states of affairs in the real world. 
Nonetheless, in line with his ideas, epistemic realism can only be accepted when a body of 
scientific outcomes is taken into consideration. Additionally, Neyman is ambiguous in his 
distinction of the real world from empirical observations. The particularly troublesome 
upshot of this is that a statistical hypothesis can be “true”, he believes, but at the same time 
always “fictitious”. 
A statistical hypothesis can be (approximately) true about the real world in the 
sense that it accurately represents a considered mechanism or characteristic of some part of 
the real world. But this truthfulness of a feature of the real world can only be scientifically 
understood and assessed via one, or another, methodological perspective; especially that of 
observational setup. The statement about the parameter value becomes scientifically 
(statistically) meaningless beyond the context of a perspective adopted. When stating that a 
hypothesis is true, this means there is an approximate empirical adequacy of perspectival 
predictions implied by the statistical model adopted. This merely approximate and only 
potential empirical adequacy of idealised prediction could be what Neyman means when 
he speaks of the fictional character of a scientific concept. 
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A bigger problem with reconciling PR with Neyman’s frequentism is that Neyman 
avoids pluralism in adopting perspectives, whereas the assumption of this pluralism is a 
precondition for perspectivism. An interesting fact is that Neyman is internally inconsistent 
by appreciating the element of decisiveness in individual choices that influence the 
outcome when he speaks of frequentism, but condemns making choices that affect the 
outcome when he criticise Bayesianism. Surprisingly, the only aspect of appreciating the 
pluralism of perspectives—the aspect of adopting error risks based on practical 
considerations—acceptable to Neyman turns out to oppose PR. Nevertheless, there are 
some aspects where pluralism of perspectives seems to be unavoidable. 
If one evaluates PR by juxtaposing it with the assumptions of statistical 
methodology as of Neyman, assumptions of PR become problematic or even incongruent 
with what the methodology implies (pluralism of perspectives is discarded). This fact 
could perhaps be well formulated by rephrasing the existentialists’ famous maxim about 
supremacy of existence over essence and saying that methodology precedes ontology; PR 
can be discarded under adoption of certain methodological solutions. Perhaps a way to 
make PR and Neyman’s frequentism more coherent could be a case (or aspect)-dependent 
relativisation of PR. 
Still, Neyman’s frequentist philosophy is ambiguous, and frequentism is not the 
only paradigm in the philosophy of statistics. Therefore the inconsistency between the two 
is not decisive. To verify the general level of (dis)agreement between PR and statistical 
methodology would require further reflection from the viewpoint of other methodological-
philosophical approaches alternative to Neyman’s. Another interesting line of research 
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would be to assess how claims tested in reference to various statistical paradigms maintain 
cross-perspectival performance adequacy. 
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